Difference between revisions of "Publications/le-quoc.07.ntms"

From LRDE

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{{Publication
 
{{Publication
| date = 2007-05-01
+
| date = 2007-03-10
 
| authors = Cuong Le Quoc, Patrick Bellot, Akim Demaille
 
| authors = Cuong Le Quoc, Patrick Bellot, Akim Demaille
 
| title = On the security of quantum networks: a proposal framework and its capacity
 
| title = On the security of quantum networks: a proposal framework and its capacity
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| abstract = In large Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)-based networksintermediate nodes are necessary because of the short length of QKD links. They have tendency to be used more than classical networks. A realistic assumption is that there are eavesdropping operations in these nodes without knowledge of legitimate network participants. We develop a QKD-based network framework. We present a percolation-based approach to discuss about conditions of extremely high secret key transmission. We propose also an adaptive stochastic routing algorithm that helps on protecting keys from reasonable eavesdroppers in a dense QKD network. We show that under some assumptions, one could prevent eavesdroppers from sniffing the secrets with an arbitrarily large probability.
 
| abstract = In large Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)-based networksintermediate nodes are necessary because of the short length of QKD links. They have tendency to be used more than classical networks. A realistic assumption is that there are eavesdropping operations in these nodes without knowledge of legitimate network participants. We develop a QKD-based network framework. We present a percolation-based approach to discuss about conditions of extremely high secret key transmission. We propose also an adaptive stochastic routing algorithm that helps on protecting keys from reasonable eavesdroppers in a dense QKD network. We show that under some assumptions, one could prevent eavesdroppers from sniffing the secrets with an arbitrarily large probability.
 
| lrdekeywords = Software engineering
 
| lrdekeywords = Software engineering
  +
| lrdenewsdate = 2007-03-10
 
| type = inproceedings
 
| type = inproceedings
 
| id = le-quoc.07.ntms
 
| id = le-quoc.07.ntms

Revision as of 16:45, 5 November 2013

Abstract

In large Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)-based networksintermediate nodes are necessary because of the short length of QKD links. They have tendency to be used more than classical networks. A realistic assumption is that there are eavesdropping operations in these nodes without knowledge of legitimate network participants. We develop a QKD-based network framework. We present a percolation-based approach to discuss about conditions of extremely high secret key transmission. We propose also an adaptive stochastic routing algorithm that helps on protecting keys from reasonable eavesdroppers in a dense QKD network. We show that under some assumptions, one could prevent eavesdroppers from sniffing the secrets with an arbitrarily large probability.


Bibtex (lrde.bib)

@InProceedings{	  le-quoc.07.ntms,
  author	= {Cuong Le Quoc and Patrick Bellot and Akim Demaille},
  title		= {On the security of quantum networks: a proposal framework
		  and its capacity},
  booktitle	= {Proceedings of the 2007 International Conference on New
		  Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS'07)},
  year		= 2007,
  address	= {Paris, France},
  month		= may,
  abstract	= {In large Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)-based networks,
		  intermediate nodes are necessary because of the short
		  length of QKD links. They have tendency to be used more
		  than classical networks. A realistic assumption is that
		  there are eavesdropping operations in these nodes without
		  knowledge of legitimate network participants. We develop a
		  QKD-based network framework. We present a percolation-based
		  approach to discuss about conditions of extremely high
		  secret key transmission. We propose also an adaptive
		  stochastic routing algorithm that helps on protecting keys
		  from reasonable eavesdroppers in a dense QKD network. We
		  show that under some assumptions, one could prevent
		  eavesdroppers from sniffing the secrets with an arbitrarily
		  large probability.}
}