Publications/le-quoc.07.ntms

Authors

Cuong Le Quoc, Patrick Bellot, Akim Demaille

Where

Proceedings of the 2007 International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS'07)

Place

Paris, France

Type

inproceedings

Keywords

Software engineering

Date

2007-03-10

Abstract

In large Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)-based networksintermediate nodes are necessary because of the short length of QKD links. They have tendency to be used more than classical networks. A realistic assumption is that there are eavesdropping operations in these nodes without knowledge of legitimate network participants. We develop a QKD-based network framework. We present a percolation-based approach to discuss about conditions of extremely high secret key transmission. We propose also an adaptive stochastic routing algorithm that helps on protecting keys from reasonable eavesdroppers in a dense QKD network. We show that under some assumptions, one could prevent eavesdroppers from sniffing the secrets with an arbitrarily large probability.

Bibtex (lrde.bib)

@InProceedings{	  le-quoc.07.ntms,
  author	= {Cuong Le Quoc and Patrick Bellot and Akim Demaille},
  title		= {On the security of quantum networks: a proposal framework
		  and its capacity},
  booktitle	= {Proceedings of the 2007 International Conference on New
		  Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS'07)},
  year		= 2007,
  address	= {Paris, France},
  month		= may,
  abstract	= {In large Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)-based networks,
		  intermediate nodes are necessary because of the short
		  length of QKD links. They have tendency to be used more
		  than classical networks. A realistic assumption is that
		  there are eavesdropping operations in these nodes without
		  knowledge of legitimate network participants. We develop a
		  QKD-based network framework. We present a percolation-based
		  approach to discuss about conditions of extremely high
		  secret key transmission. We propose also an adaptive
		  stochastic routing algorithm that helps on protecting keys
		  from reasonable eavesdroppers in a dense QKD network. We
		  show that under some assumptions, one could prevent
		  eavesdroppers from sniffing the secrets with an arbitrarily
		  large probability.}
}